The archive
throughline No. 195 September 22, 2026

FAA Cannot Detect GPS Spoofing In Real Time, GAO Report Finds

The finding is not that attacks happen. It is that the agency responsible has no instrument to observe one in progress, so detection is outsourced to pilot reports filed after landing, and every domestic count is therefore an estimate.

The finding is not that attacks happen. It is that the agency responsible has no instrument to observe one in progress, so detection is outsourced to pilot reports filed after landing, and every domestic count is therefore an estimate.

GAO report GAO-26-108439, released September 21, 2026, found the FAA has not finished its spectrum risk assessments and has no defined real-time capability to detect spoofing or jamming of aircraft communications.

Why it matters: Spoofing briefings, simulator retraining, diversions around affected corridors and the false terrain alerts that teach crews to discount alarms all land in fares and schedules, while the agency cannot say how often it is happening in United States airspace.

Date to watch: March 20, 2027 — the statutory deadline under 31 U.S.C. 720 for the Department of Transportation's written statement of actions on all nine recommendations.

Sources:

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